United States History: the Cold War and the Kennedy Presidency

It is certain, however, that relations between Moscow and Washington were already deteriorating, for a variety of reasons, and worsened more and more rapidly and severely, to the point of plunging, between 1946 and 1947, into the “cold war”. This period of the most recent history of international relations, if it regards the United States as one of the two antagonists, is above all part of general history, since, once the United States has risen to the rank of the highest world power, the development of its foreign policy does everything. one with world events. Suffice it, therefore, here, to mention the salient aspects of these events from the American point of view. Ideological reasons (conflict between communism and the “free world”) and political reasons (the classic clash between great powers) were closely intertwined in the “cold war”. While Moscow, including the Eastern Europe in its own sphere aimed essentially at security, Washington instead considered Soviet politics as an expression of expansionism and the desire to overwhelm Communism; but in reality, as the most recent investigations of American historiography itself show, she felt disappointed in her fundamental post-war project of having the “door open”, without hindrance, to a free world market where American capitalism could expand.

Thus, to respond to what was deemed the Soviet attack, the United States went to counterattack, with the “Truman doctrine” and the ” expansionism and the will to overwhelm communism; but in reality, as the most recent investigations of American historiography itself show, she felt disappointed in her fundamental post-war project of having the “door open”, without hindrance, to a free world market where American capitalism could expand. Thus, to respond to what was deemed the Soviet attack, the United States went to counterattack, with the “Truman doctrine” and the ” expansionism and the will to overwhelm communism; but in reality, as the most recent investigations of American historiography itself show, she felt disappointed in her fundamental post-war project of having the “door open”, without hindrance, to a free world market where American capitalism could expand. Thus, to respond to what was deemed the Soviet attack, the United States went to counterattack, with the “Truman doctrine” and the ” Marshall Plan ” (March and June 1947), then with the vigorous and effective response to the Soviet bloc in Berlin (1948-49), finally with the stipulation of the Atlantic Pact (April 4, 1949), the first alliance in peacetime of the entire American history, an alliance involving the establishment of integrated allied armed forces on a permanent basis, hitherto always under American supreme command. From isolationism to the Atlantic Pact, as we can see, the reversal of American foreign policy has been total. The general motivation for the American line was provided by the doctrine of containment, the containment of communism and Soviet expansionism.

This doctrine, as well as from a diplomatic point of view, was also tested militarily, when (June 1950) North Korea invaded South Korea and the United States responded by sending an expeditionary force under the aegis of the UN. The armistice concluded in Korea (July 1953) on the starting points showed that the status quo world could not be altered even by force, except running the risk of atomic war and the consequent catastrophe of humanity; even the USSR, in fact, had equipped itself with atomic bombs and thus the “balance of terror”, a paradoxical factor of peace, was achieved. The “cold war” was therefore inconclusive, an observation that the United States must have reached as well: slowly and reluctantly, since if Truman’s successor, Republican D. Eisenhower (1953-61), was a man of peace, his powerful secretary of state, J. Dulles, argued instead the need to replace containment an activist policy, which, however, was not applied when the opportunities arose. The major failure the “cold war”, understood as an anti-communist crusade, had done within the United States, with an aberrant phenomenon such as the “witch hunt” unleashed by McCarthyism. In general, the climate of the first fifteen years of the post-war period was one of restoration, of aversion to the Truman Fair Deal (attenuated version of the New Deal), of lazy self-satisfaction, in the Eisenhower years, for an opaque prosperity. According to softwareleverage, the Democratic candidate of 1960, John F. Kennedy, turned to shake the Americans, indicating to them the goal of a “new frontier” to aim for in response to the challenge of the Communist world and the Third World. In his brief presidency (1961-63), truncated by a mysterious assassination, Kennedy undoubtedly gave a more energetic tone to the domestic and foreign policy of the United States, but the results did not match expectations, did not validate the Kennedian “myth”. Inside, the protest of blacks became more and more violent, which did not subside even after the enactment of the civil rights laws of 1964 and 1965: indeed it gave rise to more than one “hot summer” in the late 1960s. On the international level, Kennedy tried to found the policy of détente, now initiated with Moscow, on the deployment of American power: hence the relationship of understanding and tension with the Soviet premier N. Khrushchev, which culminated in the “Cuban crisis” of October 1962.